| 14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' |
| 12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength |
| 12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature |
| 12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [McFetridge] |
| 12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary |
| 12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion |
| 13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake |
| 14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments |
| 14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% |
| 13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is |
| 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts |
| 14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives |
| 14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind |
| 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? |
| 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens |
| 14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism |
| 14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true |
| 14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! |
| 14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics |
| 13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions |
| 13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B |
| 14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF |
| 14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? |
| 13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition |
| 14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A |
| 14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe |
| 14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? |