Ideas of Robert Kirk, by Theme

[British, fl. 1990, Professor at Nottingham University.]

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction

4986	A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws'

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness

5001	Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality

4993	If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

5000	Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique

4982	Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism

4991	Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones

4994	Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour

4992	In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique

4990	The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

4984	All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism

4998	Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

4985	If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts

4997	It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification

4999	For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

4995	Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation