| 9786 | Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard |
| 9784 | A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system |
| 13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? |
| 13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons |
| 9783 | While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes |
| 14962 | Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts |
| 14961 | Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart |
| 13952 | Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent |
| 13954 | The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential |
| 13955 | Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic |
| 13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind |
| 13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows |
| 13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter |
| 13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have |
| 13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each |
| 13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same |
| 13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said |
| 13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words |
| 13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... |