Ideas of Thomas Mautner, by Theme
[Australian, fl. 1996, Lecturer at Australian National University.]
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
6887
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Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
6881
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Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them
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1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
5439
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The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9959
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'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
9961
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'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
9958
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Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
9960
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A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
9957
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Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes
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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
6219
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The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole
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4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
6888
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Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
6877
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Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
6880
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Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
6879
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'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q
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6878
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A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
6889
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Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
6890
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Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
6885
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Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case
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6882
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Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false
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6884
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Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q'
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6886
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Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid
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6883
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Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
5449
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Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
6898
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Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6452
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'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
4783
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Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [PG]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
4782
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'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [PG]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
6899
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The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
6896
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Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended
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6897
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Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
5452
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'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature
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