| 15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle |
| 15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist |
| 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory |
| 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. |
| 6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens |
| 6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens |
| 6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy |
| 5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above |
| 6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics |
| 15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties |
| 5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities |
| 15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events |
| 15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility |
| 6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects |
| 6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees |
| 6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false |
| 6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws |
| 6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals |
| 6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" |
| 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function |
| 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing |
| 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental |
| 6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction |
| 6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones |
| 5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism |
| 6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction |
| 6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws |
| 6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose |
| 6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations |
| 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation |
| 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification |
| 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? |
| 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name |
| 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' |
| 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true |
| 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation |
| 6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees |
| 5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms |
| 6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time |