Ideas of Robert Audi, by Theme

[American, b.1941, Professor at the University of Nebraska. Father of Paul?]

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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity

2730	Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs

2715	Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism

2735	Could you have a single belief on its own?

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

2736	We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

2721	If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?

2722	Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts

2728	The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience

2727	Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation

2716	To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field

2717	How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

2719	Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities

2720	Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

2718	Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism

2729	Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths

2741	The principles of justification have to be a priori

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

2725	To remember something is to know it

2724	I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

2731	Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge)

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

2739	Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

2732	Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent

2733	It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification

2734	A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

2738	Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge

2740	A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

2737	'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'

16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection

2726	We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

20064

Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control