Ideas of Keith Campbell, by Theme
[Australian, fl. 1990, At Sydney University.]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525
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Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518
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Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513
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Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
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8514
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Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
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8522
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Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
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8523
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Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
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8524
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Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521
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Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515
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Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
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8519
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Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033
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Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512
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Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8516
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Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved
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8517
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Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
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