Ideas of Robert C. Stalnaker, by Theme

[American, b.1940, Professor at Cornell University, then at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18823 To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14286 In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Read]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14285 A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs
15793 We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Lycan]
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
16437 Possible worlds are properties
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18052 An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
14718 An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Schroeter]