Ideas of Laurence Bonjour, by Theme

[American, b.1943, Professor at the University of Washington, at Seattle.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
3695 Philosophy is a priori if it is anything
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
3651 Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
3700 Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence
8893 For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
4261 The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
3697 The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
8888 The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
8887 It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
8897 The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3704 Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification
3707 Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
4255 Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
4257 The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
8896 Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
3696 A priori justification requires understanding but no experience
3703 You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up
3706 A priori justification can vary in degree
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
4256 The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3699 The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21506 A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth
21509 There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems
21503 Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21511 A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence
21510 The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency
21505 A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility
21504 The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8891 My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics
8892 Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input
8894 Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4258 Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
3701 Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8889 Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
4259 External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
8890 If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
4260 Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria
3702 Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
21508 Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3709 Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
8895 If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3708 All thought represents either properties or indexicals
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3698 Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief