Ideas of Willard Quine, by Theme

[American, 1908 - 2000, Born in Ohio. Studied with Carnap in Vienna. Professor at Harvard University. Taught Davidson and Lewis.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
9764 Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
9763 For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13736 Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Boulter]
22438 Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with
6891 Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
11103 We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it
6310 Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
8996 If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money...
22436 Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
16943 Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
9023 If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject
6564 To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not'
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
22431 Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements
8207 The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases
8208 In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
8995 Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute
19047 Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful
19048 Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
21699 Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
21697 The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
21750 Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
9012 Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
9011 Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
22435 The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
9013 We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)'
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely
5745 Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia]
13591 Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
22433 It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
3302 Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
9879 NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
10211 Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21717 Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Linsky,B]
18170 The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
21695 The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
21693 Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
3336 Two things can never entail three things [Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13010 In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian]
9020 My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9028 Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
9002 Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
13639 Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Shapiro]
8789 Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
10014 Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Hodes]
10828 Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13681 Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Fine,K]
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Rey]
8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false
8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions
9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role?
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
19043 Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9024 Excluded middle has three different definitions
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10012 Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
13829 If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12221 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate'
1618 We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
21698 All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8453 If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
19321 We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Kirkham]
8455 Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Orenstein]
8456 Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Orenstein]
9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K]
9016 Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
1611 Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense
10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into
10538 Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Dummett]
10311 No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Hale]
9015 Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Marcus (Barcan)]
10801 Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology
9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named
9026 Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10705 Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9027 A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
21691 Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
21690 Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9003 Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
21689 A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself?
21694 Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21692 If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
8994 If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry
16949 Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17905 Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
8997 There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
8463 Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory
8203 All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10242 I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
21696 Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9556 Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects
18198 Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8993 If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21557 Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Lackey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
1613 Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities
9004 If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic
1635 Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
1616 Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
1615 Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients
8466 For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Orenstein]
8467 Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
1614 Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
12210 Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
10241 For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
16966 Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
4064 The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19277 Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Hale]
16965 All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express
1633 Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
11092 A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8205 Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
11093 We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape
1630 We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
18438 Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states
10243 My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
19042 Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
8496 What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
11101 General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do
19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything
10667 A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
1610 To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun
19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers
5747 "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Melia]
16963 Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
16021 Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Noonan]
16964 Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
8459 Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Orenstein]
8497 An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences
3325 For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Benardete,JA]
4216 Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Lowe]
18966 Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified
18964 Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
16261 If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin]
7698 If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette]
19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo]
14490 You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
16961 In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16462 The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
11096 Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8534 Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Shapiro]
3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Benardete,JA]
6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [McGinn]
8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Orenstein]
9017 Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication
18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal'
16948 Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity'
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15490 Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Martin,CB]
16945 We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
1612 Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
3751 Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
15402 There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4443 Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
11099 Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Devitt]
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Macdonald,C]
18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
11094 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop
11097 Red is the largest red thing in the universe
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8498 Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
7924 The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science
8464 Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected
9018 A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
13387 Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
8277 I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe]
18441 No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10923 Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning
10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence
8482 Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist?
12136 Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody]
13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
9019 Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
17594 We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy'
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
18440 Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
11095 We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
10921 Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [McFetridge]
9001 Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?'
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Fine,K]
15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Shoemaker]
10924 Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves
10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified
4577 There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity
8206 Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia
8483 Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
15782 Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Lycan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
9014 Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
15725 Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
22432 Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value
15722 Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
8856 Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Yablo]
2796 For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Dancy,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12443 Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?
9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
13588 A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
13592 Beliefs can be ascribed to machines
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
18969 How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
18209 We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9379 A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9005 Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Horwich]
9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich]
9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
21686 Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts
8450 Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Orenstein]
19046 Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism
19049 In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
21685 Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Yablo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
7627 You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund]
8871 We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Davidson]
8826 If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim]
8827 Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim]
8899 Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
3868 To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Newton-Smith]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
1634 Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
16944 Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
4630 Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Baggini /Fosl]
21687 It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience
21688 There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
4713 For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [O'Grady]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
16940 Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations
16941 Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
21748 More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
16934 General terms depend on similarities among things
16947 Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine
16938 To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour?
8486 Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3131 Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
8462 A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
11104 Concepts are language
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
11102 Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
21700 Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible
21701 Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
1619 There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Miller,A]
9009 Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1617 The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy
1609 I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have'
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important
9471 Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised
8202 Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [O'Grady]
8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15788 Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19159 Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Davidson]
16932 Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18967 A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
18968 The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition?
9007 It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition
9008 There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences
9010 We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Jenkins]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
21338 I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity
8201 The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction
19050 Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
9021 A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
19045 Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3988 Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett]
6311 The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge
6312 We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai'
6313 Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive
6317 Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation
1631 You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs
1632 Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages
18963 Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6315 We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs
6314 Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them
7330 The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
21749 Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / f. Love
21751 Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
7375 Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Dennett]
16935 If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another
16936 Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red'
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
16937 You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10370 Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
16942 It is hard to see how regularities could be explained
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally
17862 Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Almog]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
18970 The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Sider]