Ideas of Gottfried Leibniz, by Theme

[German, 1646 - 1716, Born at Leipzig. Widely travelled. For a long time at the court of the Elector of Hanover. Died at Hanover.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
12926 Wisdom is the science of happiness
19396 Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application
19336 Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
12903 Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
19359 Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Perkins]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
2118 All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning
19395 Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13086 Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
16710 Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12914 Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason
12780 We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
5021 An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible
12997 Analysis is the art of finding the middle term
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
13099 Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
16897 Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Burge]
13009 A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
19335 Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
5035 The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason
3346 For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
12963 Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
19433 The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
19404 Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason
19360 General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
5042 For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence
3347 Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Benardete,JA]
2098 The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics
3646 There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise
2104 No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit
4642 No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
19342 Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
19426 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
12983 A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
12915 Definitions can only be real if the item is possible
12976 If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions
12982 One essence can be expressed by several definitions
12984 Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
12980 Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational'
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
8627 Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Frege]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
12910 The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition
19333 A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
19389 Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts
19388 True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
5022 We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections
13157 Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
13000 Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
2115 Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
12992 Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
19370 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Arthur,R]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10056 At bottom eternal truths are all conditional
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
2111 Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
12974 People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
13002 It is always good to reduce the number of axioms
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
19391 We can assign a characteristic number to every single object
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
13163 Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite
13008 Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
12920 There is no multiplicity without true units
9147 Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K]
12956 Only whole numbers are multitudes of units
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
19390 Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
19406 I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author
13190 I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
19375 The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
18081 Nature uses the infinite everywhere
18080 A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
12937 We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
23026 We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
12319 What is not truly one being is not truly a being either
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
12932 The idea of being must come from our own existence
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19400 Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist
19401 God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities
7696 Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Jacquette]
19341 There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things
19428 Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence
5062 First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19393 What is not active is nothing
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
12922 A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
19405 Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves
7565 Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Jolley]
5044 Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points
13174 A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites
13175 Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds
12747 Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension
12748 Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them
5060 All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads'
19377 A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees
12774 Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams
12777 Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them
12782 Monads control nothing outside of themselves
7644 The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie]
11857 He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Wiggins]
7843 Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire]
12751 It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber]
19363 Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance
19352 A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory
19385 All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
12966 Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
12741 If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived
12740 The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction
13184 The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances
13188 The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
12752 Only unities have any reality
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
13187 In actual things nothing is indefinite
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
12993 Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
12989 Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
10419 If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Swoyer]
13078 Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real
19383 A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him
21346 The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
12733 Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power
12735 Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning
12711 The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry]
12959 We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers
12967 I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude
13179 A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
12710 As well as extension, bodies contain powers
13079 A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth
12708 The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty
12723 The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions
12965 All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action'
12999 Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers
12749 Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
13095 Essence is primitive force, or a law of change
12714 The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting
12713 Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Garber]
13087 The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13169 I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity
13168 My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites
5056 Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity
12722 Thought terminates in force, rather than extension
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
12969 The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities'
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12941 There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
19382 Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
12990 Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
12939 Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
13170 The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12701 Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Garber]
12979 The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them
12775 Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
12971 If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation
19379 The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
12693 A body is that which exists in space
13098 We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13105 The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13075 No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
12953 Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
12745 Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances
16513 Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
12699 A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul
12921 Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
12746 We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity
12035 Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
13160 To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
19349 The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes
12916 A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance
12919 Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it
12923 Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul
12716 The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance
13197 The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy
12943 Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future
12776 Every substance is alive
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
12704 Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
7558 Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint
13161 Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line
13171 Substance must necessarily involve progress and change
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12712 Substance is that which can act
7561 Substances are essentially active [Jolley]
13091 Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon
11855 Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
7931 If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12970 We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
12986 The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
16761 Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
12715 Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Garber]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
12700 Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12968 A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12697 Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
13432 The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii
13088 Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates
13077 Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions
12908 Essences exist in the divine understanding
12743 A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
12931 Particular truths are just instances of general truths
12811 We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12706 Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena
12753 A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13083 The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
13082 The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones
13189 A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
5057 If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
11878 Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Mackie,P]
13191 The properties of a thing flow from its essence
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
12906 Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists
12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12884 The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost
12781 A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it
12805 If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things
12806 Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Jolley]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
12694 Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
11862 Leibniz was not an essentialist [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
13182 Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
12972 Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
19394 Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16504 Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them
5055 No two things are totally identical
13178 Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations
19411 In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike
19412 If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter
17554 There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
8650 Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
12734 Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands
13828 Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Hacking]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
5047 The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
13084 How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible?
12779 There is a reason why not every possible thing exists
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
5040 Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable
4307 A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
12732 Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12978 A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
19432 Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences
17079 Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source
2112 Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
12736 If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Garber]
13159 Only God sees contingent truths a priori
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
13172 What we cannot imagine may still exist
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
19402 The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible
15883 Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Harré]
18822 Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Rumfitt]
7837 Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Stewart,M]
19434 There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12904 If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me
11981 If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
13080 Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
13085 Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
5039 If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19424 Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive
19397 Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19332 For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Perkins]
12960 We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them
12998 Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
13006 Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
12905 I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
19334 I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard
12996 I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C
13003 The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am'
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
12739 If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
12742 A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist
5509 Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Martin/Barresi]
7568 Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Jolley]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
21253 Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
12929 All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses
12933 Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation
12991 Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
12940 What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas?
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9155 An a priori proof is independent of experience
9344 Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
19419 Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness
19353 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
19430 We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
12721 Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension
19358 Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
12948 A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
13005 Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
12947 We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses
4302 You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true
12930 The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas
2110 We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
19431 There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
5024 Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc.
13001 Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
5033 Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
5020 Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
19410 Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
12949 Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19392 I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
12785 Truth is mutually agreed perception
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
12738 Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
19387 Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
5053 The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
12913 Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
19398 Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12755 Final causes can help with explanations in physics
13195 To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
13089 To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events
12729 The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change
13092 The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers
12977 We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
13158 The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
12737 Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
5034 Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5045 No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
5032 It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness
5054 Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination
5061 Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
19354 Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Perkins]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
19438 Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
12944 It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions
19355 The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
2109 Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
12951 Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
13193 Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving
19364 Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad)
13183 Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
19362 We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5027 If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China
12942 Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
12973 We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
5023 Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
19413 If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted
19367 Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
2119 People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason
7841 We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
13162 Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
5031 Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe
19368 The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
19409 Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12698 Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul
5510 Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Martin/Barresi]
12760 Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
5025 Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine
7564 Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Jolley]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
5038 Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them
2596 Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks
5046 The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another
19350 We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence
19421 Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls
19351 Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
12727 It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions
12935 Every feeling is the perception of a truth
19415 Passions reside in confused perceptions
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
19423 By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think
19427 True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions
12938 An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things
12945 Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts
19357 The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow
12950 We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
12995 The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know
12807 The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
12911 Concepts are what unite a proposition
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
19372 Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Arthur,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
11873 Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
13186 Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
13467 Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Hart,WD]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
12946 The idea of the will includes the understanding
19331 Will is an inclination to pursue something good
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
19365 Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Perkins]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
19343 We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
12964 If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
12925 Beauty increases with familiarity
8110 Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
5063 Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / d. Death
13173 Death is just the contraction of an animal
19420 Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished
19346 Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / f. Love
12958 Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
12957 The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
19366 You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
12927 Happiness is advancement towards perfection
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
5019 Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
5049 Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection
12962 Pleasure is a sense of perfection
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
5026 Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
7569 Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Jolley]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
12934 We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
19407 We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
7574 Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Jolley]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
12936 There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
19429 The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
19376 A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
19356 Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
19399 Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
12707 The true elements are atomic monads
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
15955 I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena
12728 Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Garber]
19374 Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible
12759 There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension
2105 Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible
2106 The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension
2102 Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
7560 Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley]
12718 Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete
19416 Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated
19422 Every particle of matter contains organic bodies
19436 Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
16683 Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Pasnau]
13185 Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
19425 In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
5059 Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
2117 The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause
12702 Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
12907 Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world
13194 God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them
13177 An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force
11856 Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject
12994 Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties
12808 Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
19403 Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws
12725 Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Garber]
16507 The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature
11945 In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things
13198 Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained.
13093 The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
7859 Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
12696 Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants
19348 All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change
12985 Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place'
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12924 Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject
15307 Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential
12719 Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded
13167 We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass
12758 It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will
13192 Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form
13196 All qualities of bodies reduce to forces
13096 The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change
13097 Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance
16709 Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces'
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
20965 Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
12709 Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
13180 Space is the order of coexisting possibles
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
2103 The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
12952 Space is an order among actual and possible things
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
19384 Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual
13181 Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities
2100 Space and time are purely relative
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
12955 If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
12720 Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist
2107 No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
2101 If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
22908 When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
5043 To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
19414 Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
12954 God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents
19326 God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities
19439 God produces possibilities, and thus ideas
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
5041 God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason
5048 Perfection is simply quantity of reality
12988 The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony
1414 A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit
19327 The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities
2114 This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
21252 Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
22894 If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Bardon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
19344 God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
19330 If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
19328 Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
3889 God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Scruton]
2116 The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing
19325 God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity
2113 God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
19418 Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover
2099 The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
2595 If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source
19417 All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause
19329 The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
12909 Everything, even miracles, belongs to order
5030 Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design
12784 Allow no more miracles than are necessary
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
19408 To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
7842 Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Stewart,M]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
19437 Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
12912 Immortality without memory is useless
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
12917 The soul is indestructible and always self-aware
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
12918 Animals have souls, but lack consciousness
5058 Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
19339 Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being
13164 God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it
19340 Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin
19337 How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice?
19345 Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
5037 God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred
5050 Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure