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Ideas of Wilson,G/Schpall,S, by Text

[American, fl. 2012, At the University of Southern California.]

2012 Action
Intro p.1 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent
Intro p.1 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
1 p.2 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous
1.1 p.2 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief
1.1 p.2 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief
1.1 p.3 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation
1.2 p.3 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving
1.2 p.5 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it?
2 p.7 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
2 p.7 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
2 p.8 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
2 p.10 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents
2 p.10 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
3 p.11 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
4 p.13 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires