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Ideas of Wilson,G/Schpall,S, by Text

[American, fl. 2012, At the University of Southern California.]

2012 Action
Intro p.1 20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent
Intro p.1 20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
1 p.2 20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous
1.1 p.2 20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief
1.1 p.2 20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief
1.1 p.3 20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation
1.2 p.3 20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving
1.2 p.5 20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it?
2 p.7 20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
2 p.7 20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
2 p.8 20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
2 p.10 20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents
2 p.10 20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
3 p.11 20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
4 p.13 20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires