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Ideas of Barbara Vetter, by Text

[German, fl. 2014, Studied at Oxford. At Humbolt University, Berlin.]

2010 Essence and Potentiality
1 p.4 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
1 p.4 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity
2 p.5 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
3 p.7 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility
3 p.8 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
4 p.9 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality
4 p.10 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible
p.2 p.2 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued
2012 Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature
9.3 p.201 Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain
2015 Potentiality
p.28 A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
1.1 p.2 Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
1.1 p.2 The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
1.1 p.3 All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
1.2 p.6 If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
1.2 p.7 The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
1.4 p.18 Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
1.6 p.25 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
1.6 p.27 Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
1.7 p.30 We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
2.7 p.61 Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
3.5 p.88 Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
4.1 p.102 Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
4.5 p.133 Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
4.6 p.135 I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
4.6 p.136 Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
5.3.3 p.157 Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
5.7.2 p.178 A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
5.7.4 p.183 Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
5.8 p.191 If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
5.9 p.196 Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
6.1 p.197 Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
6.2 p.203 It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
6.2 p.204 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
6.4 p.207 There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
6.4 n5 p.213 S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
6.9.2 p.239 Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
7.3 p.258 The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
7.5 p.267 The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
7.5 p.269 Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
7.8 p.282 Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
7.8 p.288 The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
7.9 p.291 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
7.9 p.294 Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions