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Ideas of Barbara Vetter, by Text
[German, fl. 2014, Studied at Oxford. At Humbolt University, Berlin.]
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2010
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Essence and Potentiality
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§1
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p.4
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17953
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Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
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§1
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p.4
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17952
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Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity
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§2
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p.5
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17954
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Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
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§3
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p.7
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17955
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Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility
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§3
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p.8
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17956
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Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
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§4
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p.9
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17957
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Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality
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§4
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p.10
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17958
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The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible
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p.2
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p.2
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17959
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Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued
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2012
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Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature
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9.3
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p.201
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17993
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Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain
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1.1
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p.2
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19008
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The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
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1.1
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p.2
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19009
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Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
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1.1
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p.3
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19010
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All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
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1.2
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p.6
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19011
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If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
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1.2
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p.7
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19012
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The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
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1.4
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p.18
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19013
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Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
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1.6
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p.25
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19014
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How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
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1.6
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p.27
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19015
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Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
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1.7
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p.30
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19016
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We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
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2.7
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p.61
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19017
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Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
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3.5
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p.88
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19018
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Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
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4.1
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p.102
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19019
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Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
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4.5
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p.133
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19020
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Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
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4.6
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p.135
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19021
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I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
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4.6
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p.136
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19022
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Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
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5.3.3
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p.157
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19023
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Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
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5.7.2
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p.178
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19024
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A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
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5.7.4
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p.183
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19025
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Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
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5.8
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p.191
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19026
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If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
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5.9
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p.196
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19027
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Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
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6.1
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p.197
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19028
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Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
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6.2
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p.203
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19029
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It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
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6.2
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p.204
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19030
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Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
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6.4
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p.207
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19031
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There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
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6.4 n5
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p.213
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19032
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S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
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6.9.2
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p.239
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19033
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Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
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7.3
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p.258
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19034
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The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
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7.5
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p.267
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19036
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The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
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7.5
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p.269
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19037
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Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
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7.8
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p.282
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19038
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Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
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7.8
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p.288
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19039
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The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
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7.9
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p.291
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19040
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We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
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7.9
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p.294
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19041
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Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
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