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Ideas of Robert Pasnau, by Text

[American, fl. 2011, Professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder.]

2011 Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
02.5 p.29 16579 There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates
02.5 p.29 16580 A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change
02.5 p.30 16581 Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing
02.5 p.33 16583 Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure
02.5 p.33 16584 If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure
03.1 p.38 16586 The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle
03.2 p.41 16592 Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it
03.3 p.49 16596 A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do
04.3 p.63 16598 Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics
04.5 p.75 16602 Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form
04.5 p.76 16603 In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science
05.1 p.77 16604 Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus
05.1 p.77 16605 After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known
05.1 p.79 16606 Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers
05.3 p.84 16607 Renaissance Platonism is peripheral
05.4 p.91 16609 Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic
05.5 p.93 16610 Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes
06.1 p.101 16612 Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance
06.1 p.101 16613 Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory
06.1 p.102 16615 Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones
06.2 p.105 16617 Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist
07.3 p.129 16628 Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance
1.1 p.1 16568 Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle
10.3 p.185 16642 Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance
11.2 p.208 16649 Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable'
12.1 p.222 16653 Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology
13.1 p.244 16662 The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances
14.1 p.280 16671 Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way
14.3 p.291 16677 Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can
14.4 p.297 16680 Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation
18.1 p.378 16694 Typical successive things are time and motion
19.3 p.408 16704 In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years
20.2 p.442 16715 Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy
21.2 p.468 16722 Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry
22.3 p.500 16727 In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form
23.1 p.519 16732 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers
23.1 p.519 16733 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions
23.5 p.535 16738 Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require
23.5 p.538 16741 Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics
24.1 p.549 16747 Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle
24.1 p.550 16748 Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms
24.1 p.551 16749 Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential
24.2 p.555 16750 If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances?
24.2 p.563 16759 Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause
24.4 p.564 16760 Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism
25.2 p.580 16767 There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding
25.3 p.584 16769 If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident
26.1 p.606 16775 For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts
26.1 p.609 16777 If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties
26.6 p.632 16781 The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck
27.5 p.648 16783 Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents
27.6 p.654 16785 If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult
28.2 p.669 16788 Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions