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Ideas of Robert Pasnau, by Text

[American, fl. 2011, Professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder.]

2011 Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
02.5 p.29 There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates
02.5 p.29 A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change
02.5 p.30 Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing
02.5 p.33 Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure
02.5 p.33 If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure
03.1 p.38 The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle
03.2 p.41 Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it
03.3 p.49 A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do
04.3 p.63 Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics
04.5 p.75 Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form
04.5 p.76 In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science
05.1 p.77 Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus
05.1 p.77 After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known
05.1 p.79 Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers
05.3 p.84 Renaissance Platonism is peripheral
05.4 p.91 Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic
05.5 p.93 Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes
06.1 p.101 Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance
06.1 p.101 Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory
06.1 p.102 Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones
06.2 p.105 Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist
07.3 p.129 Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance
1.1 p.1 Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle
10.3 p.185 Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance
11.2 p.208 Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable'
12.1 p.222 Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology
13.1 p.244 The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances
14.1 p.280 Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way
14.3 p.291 Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can
14.4 p.297 Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation
18.1 p.378 Typical successive things are time and motion
19.3 p.408 In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years
20.2 p.442 Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy
21.2 p.468 Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry
22.3 p.500 In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form
23.1 p.519 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers
23.1 p.519 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions
23.5 p.535 Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require
23.5 p.538 Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics
24.1 p.549 Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle
24.1 p.550 Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms
24.1 p.551 Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential
24.2 p.555 If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances?
24.2 p.563 Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause
24.4 p.564 Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism
25.2 p.580 There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding
25.3 p.584 If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident
26.1 p.606 For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts
26.1 p.609 If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties
26.6 p.632 The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck
27.5 p.648 Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents
27.6 p.654 If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult
28.2 p.669 Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions