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Ideas of L.A. Paul, by Text
[American, fl. 2006, University of Arizona and Australia National University, then N.Carolina,Chapel Hill.]
2006
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In Defense of Essentialism
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Intro
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p.333
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14190
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
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Intro
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p.333
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14189
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'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds
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Intro
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p.334
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14191
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Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures
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Intro
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p.334
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14192
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Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality
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§1
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p.334
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14193
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal
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§1
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p.340
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort
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§1
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p.341
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14196
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals
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§3
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p.349
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14197
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An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities
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§5
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p.360
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14198
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Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties
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