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Ideas of Ross P. Cameron, by Text

[British, fl. 2008, Lecturer at University of Leeds, and St Andrew's.]

2008 Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology
'Grounding' p.123 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
'Grounding' p.125 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
'Grounding' p.125 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
'Max and Nec' p.107 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
'Max and Nec' p.107 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
'Max and Nec' p.107 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
'Max and Nec' p.108 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
'Max and Nec' p.108 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
'Max and Nec' p.110 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
'Max and Nec' p.112 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
'Realism' p.116 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
'Realism' p.117 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
'Realism' p.121 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
'Realism' p.122 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
2009 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
'Analysis' p.273 Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings
'Intro' p.265 An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently
'Personal' p.267 Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one
'Truthmakers' p.267 Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?
'Truthmakers' p.267 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
2010 On the Source of Necessity
2 p.140 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one)
2 p.142 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
4 p.149 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically
2011 Truthmaking for Presentists
2 p.59 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
3 p.64 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
4 p.70 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
4 p.72 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?
4 p.76 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
4 p.77 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
4 n24 p.75 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
6 p.82 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
6 p.85 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation