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Ideas of Ross P. Cameron, by Text

[British, fl. 2008, Lecturer at University of Leeds, and St Andrew's.]

2008 Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology
'Grounding' p.123 18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
'Grounding' p.125 18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
'Grounding' p.125 18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
'Max and Nec' p.107 18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
'Max and Nec' p.107 18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
'Max and Nec' p.107 18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
'Max and Nec' p.108 18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
'Max and Nec' p.108 18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
'Max and Nec' p.110 18872 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
'Max and Nec' p.112 18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
'Realism' p.116 18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
'Realism' p.117 18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
'Realism' p.121 18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
'Realism' p.122 18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
2009 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
'Analysis' p.273 15401 Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings
'Intro' p.265 15393 An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently
'Personal' p.267 15396 Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one
'Truthmakers' p.267 15394 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
'Truthmakers' p.267 15395 Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?
2010 On the Source of Necessity
2 p.140 15102 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one)
2 p.142 15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
4 p.149 15104 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically
2011 Truthmaking for Presentists
2 p.59 18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
3 p.64 18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
4 p.70 18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
4 p.72 18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?
4 p.76 18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
4 p.77 18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
4 n24 p.75 18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
6 p.82 18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
6 p.85 18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation