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Ideas of Ofra Magidor, by Text

[Israeli, fl. 2009, At Balliol College, Oxford.]

2013 Category Mistakes
1.1 p.5 Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic
1.1 p.5 Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts
1.1 p.5 Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful
1.1 p.6 Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds?
1.1 n1 p.2 Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes
1.3 p.18 Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules
2.1 p.26 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure
2.3 p.33 Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages
2.3 p.36 Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules
2.4 p.39 Embedded (in 'he said thatů') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem
3.2.1 p.46 Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional
3.2.1 p.47 The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful
3.2.2 p.56 Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd
3.3 p.58 If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful
3.4 p.61 To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green?
3.4 p.62 People have dreams which involve category mistakes
3.4 p.63 Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances
3.5 p.66 Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains
3.5 p.67 Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes
3.5 p.67 Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings
3.5 p.68 The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them
3.5 p.68 One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile
3.5 p.69 Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional'
3.5 p.71 Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context
3.5 p.72 Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings
3.5 p.73 Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal
3.6 p.75 If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless
3.6 p.75 A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless
3.6.2 p.77 Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless
3.6.2 p.77 Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless
4.1 p.80 Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content
4.1 p.81 A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value
4.2 p.84 Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply?
4.3.1 p.91 If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value?
4.4 p.100 Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible
5.1 p.111 Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality)
5.2 p.112 The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set
5.2 p.112 The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set p.117 A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? p.119 A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' p.120 The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions
5.3.2 p.124 If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition
5.3.2 p.124 In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion
5.3.2 p.127 The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context
5.3.2 p.129 Why do certain words trigger presuppositions?
5.4.1 p.132 Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false')
5.4.1 p.132 In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured
5.4.1 p.136 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable
5.4.3 p.146 Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things?
5.6 p.156 The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology
5.6 p.157 We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise