green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of E Margolis/S Laurence, by Text

[American, fl. 2009, Professors at Vancouver and Sheffield.]

2009 Concepts
1 p.2 Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses
1.1 p.2 Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices
1.1 p.3 A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations
1.2 p.3 Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats
1.2 p.4 The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes
1.2 p.4 Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations
2.1 p.6 Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them
2.1 p.7 Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums
2.1 p.7 The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference
2.1 p.8 It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure
2.2 p.8 The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties
2.2 p.8 Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents
2.2 p.8 People don't just categorise by apparent similarities
2.2 p.8 Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes
2.2 p.8 Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype
2.3 p.9 The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles
2.3 p.9 The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts?
2.4 p.10 Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts
2.5 p.10 Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition
3.2 p.12 Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations
3.2 p.12 Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme
4.2 p.16 People can formulate new concepts which are only named later
5.2 p.19 Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition