| 2003 | Mereology |
| 1 | p.2 | 10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal |
| 1 | p.3 | 10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so |
| 2.1 | p.4 | 10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation |
| 2.1 | p.5 | 10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not |
| 2.1 | p.5 | 10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood |
| 2.1 | p.5 | 10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded |
| 2.2 | p.6 | 10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates |
| 3 | p.8 | 10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? |
| 3.2 | p.9 | 10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters |
| 4.1 | p.14 | 10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything |
| 4.3 | p.18 | 10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things |