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Ideas of Edwin D. Mares, by Text
[New Zealand, fl. 2001, Lecturer at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand.]
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01.5
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p.6
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17700
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The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another
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02.2
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p.16
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17701
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Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements
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02.3
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p.17
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17702
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Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components
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02.9
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p.31
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17704
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Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them
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02.9
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p.31
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17703
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Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so
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03.01
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p.34
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17705
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Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights
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03.10
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p.49
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17706
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The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations?
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06.7
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p.97
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17708
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Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size
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08.1
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p.123
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17710
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Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience
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08.2
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p.125
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17713
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After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments
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08.9
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p.135
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17714
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Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason
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11.4
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p.178
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17715
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The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied
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11.7
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p.182
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17716
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Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience
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1
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p.181
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18781
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Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system
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1
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p.181
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18780
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Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence
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1
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p.182
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18783
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Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system
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1
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p.182
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18782
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The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory
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2.2
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p.183
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18784
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In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws
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2.2
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p.184
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18785
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Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic
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2.2
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p.185
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18786
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Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation
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3.1
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p.185
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18787
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Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition
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5.1
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p.196
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18788
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For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting
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5.5
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p.200
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18789
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Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction
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5.5
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p.202
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18790
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Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation
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6.1
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p.204
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18791
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In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations
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6.2
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p.206
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18792
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Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations
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7.1
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p.208
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18793
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Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications
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