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Ideas of J Ladyman / D Ross, by Text

[British, fl. 2007, Professors at Bristol, and Alabama, Birmingham.]

2007 Every Thing Must Go
1.1 p.2 14891 There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics
1.1 p.4 14892 The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful
1.2.1 p.12 14897 We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something
1.2.1 p.13 14898 Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth
1.2.2 p.16 14899 Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think?
1.2.3 p.20 14900 In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology
1.2.3 p.23 14901 Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic
1.2.3 p.24 14902 Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit
1.2.3 p.25 14903 Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities
1.3 p.28 14904 Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science
1.3 p.29 14905 The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters
1.3 p.35 14907 Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science
1.3 p.37 14908 Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation
1.3 p.41 14909 Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical)
1.5 n45 p.45 14910 Some science is so general that it is metaphysical
1.6 n54 p.57 14911 Science is opposed to downward causation
1.7 p.58 14912 There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories
2.1.1 p.71 14913 We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory
2.1.2 p.75 14914 Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular
2.1.3 p.78 14915 The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions
2.1.3 p.79 14916 What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so
2.3.1 p.98 14918 The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified
2.4 p.123 14920 If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work
2.4.1 p.125 14921 The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables
2.4.1 p.126 14922 The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate
3.1 p.133 14923 In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one
3.2 p.142 14924 If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance?
3.4 p.148 14925 The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata
3.4 p.152 14926 Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties
3.4 p.153 14927 Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals
3.4 p.153 14928 Things are abstractions from structures
3.5 p.154 14929 A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related
3.5 p.155 14931 That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals
3.5 p.155 14930 Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects
3.5 n50 p.156 14932 Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations
3.6 p.160 10493 If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics
3.6 p.160 14934 Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics
3.7.2 p.171 14936 A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything
3.7.2 p.172 14937 That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics
3.7.2 p.173 14939 Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic
3.7.2 p.174 14940 Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics
3.7.2 n75 p.173 14938 A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible
3.7.3 p.178 14941 We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns
3.7.3 p.179 14942 Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive
3.7.5 p.183 14943 Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing
3.8 p.189 14944 There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales
4.1 p.194 14945 The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics
4.2 p.199 14946 There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics
4.3 p.210 14947 Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information
4.4 p.226 14948 To be is to be a real pattern
4.4 p.231 14949 A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation
4.5 p.240 14950 Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth
4.5 p.241 14951 We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it
4.5 p.242 14952 Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it)
4.5 p.255 14953 Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved
4.5 p.257 14954 Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics
5.2 p.267 14955 Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones
5.6 p.292 14956 Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality
5.6 p.294 14957 There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature
5.6 p.296 14958 A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time