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Ideas of Penelope Mackie, by Text

[British, fl. 2006, Lecturer at the University of Nottingham.]

2006 How Things Might Have Been
1.1 p.1 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without
10.1 p.172 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications
10.1 p.172 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind
10.1. p.198 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
10.2 p.173 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not
2.1/2 p.19 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object
2.2 p.21 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing
2.2 n7 p.21 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities
2.5 p.25 There are problems both with individual essences and without them
2.7 p.30 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'
2.8 p.34 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences
4.1 p.71 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
5.3 p.86 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
6.5 p.108 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
6.9 p.116 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions
8.2 p.134 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time
8.5 p.141 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence
8.6 p.144 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?