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Ideas of Alex Orenstein, by Text
[American, fl. 2002, Professor at the City University of New York.]
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Ch.2
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p.15
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8452
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Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims
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Ch.2
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p.27
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8454
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The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc.
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Ch.2
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p.36
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8457
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The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs
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Ch.3
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p.44
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8458
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Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism
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Ch.3
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p.55
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8465
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Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory
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Ch.3
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p.70
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8471
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Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way
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Ch.5
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p.98
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8472
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Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable)
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Ch.5
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p.99
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8473
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The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic
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Ch.5
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p.99
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8474
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Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete
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Ch.5
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p.103
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8475
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The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance
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Ch.5
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p.109
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8476
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Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role
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Ch.6
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p.121
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8477
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People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference
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Ch.7
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p.151
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8480
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S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p'
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Ch.7
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p.171
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8484
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If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions
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