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Ideas of Alex Orenstein, by Text

[American, fl. 2002, Professor at the City University of New York.]

2002 W.V. Quine
Ch.2 p.15 Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims
Ch.2 p.27 The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc.
Ch.2 p.36 The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs
Ch.3 p.44 Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism
Ch.3 p.55 Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory
Ch.3 p.70 Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way
Ch.5 p.98 Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable)
Ch.5 p.99 The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic
Ch.5 p.99 Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete
Ch.5 p.103 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance
Ch.5 p.109 Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role
Ch.6 p.121 People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference
Ch.7 p.151 S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p'
Ch.7 p.171 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions