green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of Bob Hale, by Text
[British, fl. 2001, Professor at Glasgow Univerity.]
|
Ch.1
|
p.3
|
10307
|
The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage
|
|
Ch.1
|
p.4
|
10308
|
Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms
|
|
Ch.1
|
p.13
|
10310
|
Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated
|
|
Ch.2
|
p.18
|
10312
|
Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference
|
|
Ch.2.II
|
p.21
|
10313
|
Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment
|
|
Ch.2.II
|
p.24
|
10314
|
An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase
|
|
Ch.2.II
|
p.27
|
10315
|
We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?'
|
|
Ch.2.II
|
p.28
|
10316
|
We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage
|
|
Ch.2.II
|
p.33
|
10318
|
Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns
|
|
Ch.2.II
|
p.39
|
10321
|
We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion
|
|
Ch.2.III
|
p.41
|
10322
|
If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects
|
|
Ch.3 Intro
|
p.46
|
10511
|
It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns
|
|
Ch.3.1
|
p.49
|
10514
|
If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract
|
|
Ch.3.1
|
p.49
|
10513
|
Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal
|
|
Ch.3.I
|
p.46
|
10512
|
The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located
|
|
Ch.3.II
|
p.53
|
10517
|
Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract
|
|
Ch.3.II
|
p.55
|
10518
|
Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not
|
|
Ch.3.III
|
p.56
|
10520
|
Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract
|
|
Ch.3.III
|
p.56
|
10519
|
The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names
|
|
Ch.3.III
|
p.57
|
10521
|
If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations
|
|
Ch.3.III
|
p.57
|
10522
|
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations
|
|
Ch.3.III
|
p.59
|
10523
|
Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated
|
|
Ch.3.III
|
p.61
|
10524
|
There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations
|
|
1996
|
Absolute Necessities
|
|
|
p.16
|
8261
|
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute
|
|
1
|
p.94
|
15081
|
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way
|
|
1
|
p.94
|
15080
|
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true)
|
|
2
|
p.95
|
15082
|
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood
|
|
3
|
p.100
|
15085
|
'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts
|
|
4
|
p.101
|
15086
|
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically
|
|
p.10
|
p.10
|
15088
|
Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts
|
|
p.9
|
p.9
|
15087
|
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts
|
|
1998
|
Reals by Abstraction
|
|
|
p.27
|
10632
|
The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale/Wright]
|
|
2002
|
The Source of Necessity
|
|
p.301
|
p.301
|
12432
|
Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent
|
|
p.302
|
p.302
|
12433
|
If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity
|
|
p.308
|
p.308
|
12434
|
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary?
|
|
p.311
|
p.311
|
12435
|
The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth)
|
|
P.313
|
p.313
|
12436
|
Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary
|
|
Intro
|
p.1
|
19275
|
You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity
|
|
Intro
|
p.5
|
19276
|
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence
|
|
03.2
|
p.68
|
19278
|
There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p
|
|
03.3.2
|
p.71
|
19279
|
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary?
|
|
03.4.1
|
p.82
|
19281
|
Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it
|
|
03.4.3
|
p.88
|
19282
|
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts
|
|
04.1
|
p.98
|
19285
|
Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case
|
|
04.1
|
p.99
|
19286
|
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p
|
|
04.5
|
p.114
|
19287
|
Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader
|
|
04.5
|
p.115
|
19288
|
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities
|
|
05.2
|
p.120
|
19289
|
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed
|
|
05.5.2
|
p.136
|
19290
|
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary
|
|
06.4
|
p.151
|
19291
|
A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen
|
|
06.6
|
p.158
|
19293
|
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures
|
|
07.1
|
p.165
|
19294
|
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences?
|
|
07.4
|
p.177
|
19295
|
Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers
|
|
08.2
|
p.182
|
19296
|
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets
|
|
09.2
|
p.204
|
19297
|
The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic
|
|
09.2 n7
|
p.205
|
19298
|
Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems
|
|
10.3
|
p.227
|
19299
|
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic
|
|
11.2
|
p.251
|
19300
|
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means
|
|
11.3
|
p.259
|
19301
|
With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae
|
|
11.3.7
|
p.276
|
19302
|
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes
|