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Ideas of E Conee / R Feldman, by Text

[American, fl. 2004, both Professors at the University of Rochester.]

1985 Evidentialism
'Doxastic' p.86 We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs
     Full Idea: Our limited cognitive capacities lead Goldman to deny a principle instructing people to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since they are unable to have the infinite number of beliefs that following such a principle would require.
     From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Doxastic')
     A reaction: This doesn't sound like much of an objection to epistemic closure, which I took to be the claim that you know the 'known' entailments of your knowledge.
'Justification' p.88 If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right)
     Full Idea: If it is intellectually required that one try to believe all and only truths (as Chisholm says), ...then it is possible to believe some unsubstantiated proposition in a reckless endeavour to believe a truth, and happen to be right.
     From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Justification')
     A reaction: This implies doxastic voluntarism. Sorry! I meant, this implies that we can control what we believe, when actually we believe what impinges on us as facts.
2004 Introduction to 'Evidentialism'
p.1 p.1 Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence
     Full Idea: Fundamentally Evidentialism is a supervenience thesis, according to which facts about whether or not a person is justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts describing the evidence the person has.
     From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.1)
     A reaction: If facts 'describe', does that make them linguistic? That's not how I use 'facts'. A statement of a fact is not the same as the fact. An ugly fact can be beautifully expressed. I am, however, in favour of evidence.
p.3 p.3 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally
     Full Idea: In decision theory, there is a view according to which the rational basis for all decisions is evidential. This kind of decision theory is typically contrasted with causal decision theory.
     From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.3)
     A reaction: Your Kantian presumably likes rational reflection on evidence, and your modern reductive scientist prefers causality (which doesn't really sound very rational).