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Ideas of François Recanati, by Text

[French, b.1952, Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris. Director of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.]

2012 Mental Files
05.1 p.57 Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features
1.1 p.3 Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
10.1 p.116 Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names
10.2 p.120 Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense
11.3 p.140 Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
12.2 p.150 There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
12.3 p.155 Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object
13.1 p.164 Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content
14.1 p.183 An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person
16.2 p.214 Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication
16.2 p.215 The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
17.1 p.221 Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
17.1 p.224 Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
17.3 p.231 Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well)
17.3 p.233 Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction
18.1 p.243 We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
18.1 p.246 If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things
18.2 p.252 In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference
2.1 p.17 Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
2.1 p.17 In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
2.2 p.18 A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
2.2 p.21 Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things
2.2 p.21 Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
3.1 p.29 Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
3.2 p.29 There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct
3.3 p.35 Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms
3.3 p.35 The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains
3.4 p.41 Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses
4.1 p.42 A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object
4.1 p.42 Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
5.1 p.57 Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do
5.1 p.57 Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction
5.3 p.64 Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
6.1-3 p.68 There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files
6.3 p.75 Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic
8.3 p.100 A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files
2016 Mental Files in Flux
Pref p.-12 Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers
Pref p.-10 The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files
5 p.71 A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to
5.2 p.77 A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously
6.1 p.97 Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought
7.1 p.111 How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context?
7.1 p.111 The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker
7.2 p.119 There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance