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Ideas of Alan Sidelle, by Text
[American, fl. 2002, Professor at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.]
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1989
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Necessity, Essence and Individuation
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p.282
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15032
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Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sider]
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Ch.1
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p.1
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15165
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A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths
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Ch.1
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p.1
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15164
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We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination
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Ch.1
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p.11
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15166
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Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open
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Ch.1
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p.12
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15167
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Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths
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Ch.1
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p.14
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15168
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That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water'
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Ch.1
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p.17
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15169
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Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it)
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Ch.2
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p.25
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15171
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The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence
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Ch.2
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p.26
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15172
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Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties
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Ch.2
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p.37
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15173
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That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery
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Ch.3
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p.65
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15174
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A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference
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Ch.3
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p.73
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15175
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Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects
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Ch.3
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p.77
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15176
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The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention
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Ch.4
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p.89
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15177
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Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable
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Ch.4
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p.95
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15178
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Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers?
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Ch.4
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p.100
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15179
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To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary
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Ch.4
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p.115
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15180
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There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts
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Ch.4
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p.126
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15181
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Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property
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Ch.5
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p.163
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15182
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Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles
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Ch.6
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p.190
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15184
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Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities
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Ch.6
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p.200
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15185
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We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it
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Ch.6 n11
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p.178
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15183
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'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term
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