green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of J Baggini / PS Fosl, by Text

[British, fl. 2003, Baggini is the editor of 'Philosophy Now']

2003 The Philosopher's Toolkit
§1.01 p.5 Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
§1.03 p.9 How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction?
§1.03 p.10 The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature
§1.06 p.17 Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality
§1.09 p.26 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms
§1.09 p.26 In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use
§1.12 p.37 You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it
§2.01 p.38 Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness
§2.03 p.44 Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts
§3.01 p.66 To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations
§3.03 p.71 The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin'
§3.16 p.100 Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects
§3.17 p.103 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [PG]
§3.28 p.128 The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations
§3.29 p.131 A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified
§4.01 p.134 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false
§4.01 p.135 Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?
§4.17 p.171 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good