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Ideas of J Baggini / PS Fosl, by Text
[British, fl. 2003, Baggini is the editor of 'Philosophy Now']
2003
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The Philosopher's Toolkit
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§1.01
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p.5
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4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
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§1.03
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p.9
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4583
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How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction?
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§1.03
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p.10
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4584
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The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature
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§1.06
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p.17
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4629
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Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality
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§1.09
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p.26
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4631
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In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use
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§1.09
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p.26
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4632
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'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms
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§1.12
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p.37
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4633
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You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it
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§2.01
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p.38
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4634
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Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness
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§2.03
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p.44
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4635
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Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts
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§3.01
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p.66
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4637
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To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations
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§3.03
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p.71
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4638
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The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin'
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§3.16
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p.100
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4639
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Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects
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§3.17
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p.103
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4640
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If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [PG]
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§3.28
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p.128
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4643
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The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations
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§3.29
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p.131
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4644
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A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified
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§4.01
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p.134
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4645
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'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false
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§4.01
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p.135
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4646
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Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?
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§4.17
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p.171
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4647
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'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good
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