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Ideas of Paul O'Grady, by Text
[Irish, fl. 2002, At Trinity College, Dublin.]
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Ch.1
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p.2
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4697
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There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn'
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Ch.1
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p.10
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4698
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What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them
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Ch.2
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p.33
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4700
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A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false'
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Ch.2
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p.36
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4701
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To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
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Ch.2
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p.41
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4703
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The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
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Ch.2
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p.44
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4704
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Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one
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Ch.2
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p.46
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4705
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Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system
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Ch.2
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p.51
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4706
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Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
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Ch.3
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p.58
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4710
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Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts'
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Ch.3
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p.58
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4709
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Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints
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Ch.3
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p.59
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4711
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Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties
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Ch.3
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p.74
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4715
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We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
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Ch.3
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p.80
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4717
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If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
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Ch.4
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p.90
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4719
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Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
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Ch.4
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p.93
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4720
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Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised
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Ch.4
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p.97
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4722
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Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
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Ch.4
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p.100
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4723
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Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
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Ch.4
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p.102
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4724
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Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
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Ch.4
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p.105
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4725
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Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests
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Ch.4
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p.111
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4727
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The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas
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Ch.5
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p.141
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4731
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Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
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Ch.5
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p.158
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4732
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One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
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Ch.5
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p.169
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4734
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Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it
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Ch.6
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p.175
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4735
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Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality
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