| 1965 | Free Will Defence |
| III | p.118 | 1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [PG] |
| Pref. | p.106 | 1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [PG] |
| 1969 | De Re and De Dicto |
| p.26 | p.26 | 14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' |
| p.27 | p.27 | 14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true |
| p.35 | p.35 | 14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it |
| p.37 | p.37 | 14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? |
| p.40 | p.40 | 14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? |
| p.41 | p.41 | 14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? |
| p.43 | p.43 | 14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism |
| p.44 | p.44 | 14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? |
| 1970 | World and Essence |
| p.2 | 16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Stalnaker] |
| Intro | p.47 | 14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent |
| Intro | p.49 | 14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) |
| I | p.49 | 14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world |
| I | p.50 | 14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts |
| II | p.56 | 14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? |
| II | p.58 | 14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties |
| II | p.58 | 14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it |
| III | p.63 | 14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies |
| III | p.65 | 14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? |
| IV | p.69 | 14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties |
| 1973 | Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? |
| I | p.147 | 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs |
| I | p.150 | 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different |
| I | p.152 | 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos |
| I | p.155 | 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual |
| II | p.157 | 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties |
| II | p.162 | 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates |
| II | p.163 | 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently |
| 1974 | The Nature of Necessity |
| p.80 | 11891 | Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Mackie,P] |
| p.83 | 18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Armstrong] |
| p.213 | p.59 | 20704 | A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Davies,B] |
| 1976 | Actualism and Possible Worlds |
| p.117 | 16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Stalnaker] |
| p.118 | 16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker] |
| p.123 | 16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker] |
| Intro | p.103 | 14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. |
| 1 | p.108 | 14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one |
| 2 | p.110 | 14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds |
| 4 | p.116 | 14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified |
| 1979 | De Essentia |
| p.130 | 13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Westerhoff] |
| 1993 | Why Propositions cannot be concrete |
| p.229 | p.229 | 9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true |
| p.230 | p.230 | 9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths |
| p.232 | p.232 | 9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction |
| p.233 | p.233 | 9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts |
| 1993 | Warrant and Proper Function |
| p.26 | 6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Pollock/Cruz] |