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Ideas of Ned Block, by Text

[American, b.1942, Professor at MIT until 1996, then at New York University.]

1978 Troubles with Functionalism
p. 69 p.69 2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations
p. 69 p.69 2574 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions
p. 69 p.69 2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries
p. 70 p.70 2578 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
p. 70 p.70 2577 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine
p. 71 p.71 2580 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state
p. 71 p.71 2579 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds
p. 78 p.78 2582 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia
p. 78 p.78 2581 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not
p. 81 p.81 2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs
p. 83 p.83 2584 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain
p. 86 p.86 2585 Not just any old functional network will have mental states
p. 87 p.87 2586 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
1984 works
p.153 3178 A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Rey]
1990 Inverted Earth
p.132 6172 The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Rowlands]
1998 Semantics, Conceptual Role
p.955 18033 The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions