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Ideas of Ned Block, by Text

[American, b.1942, Professor at MIT until 1996, then at New York University.]

1978 Troubles with Functionalism
p. 69 p.69 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations
p. 69 p.69 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions
p. 69 p.69 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries
p. 70 p.70 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
p. 70 p.70 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine
p. 71 p.71 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state
p. 71 p.71 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds
p. 78 p.78 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia
p. 78 p.78 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not
p. 81 p.81 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs
p. 83 p.83 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain
p. 86 p.86 Not just any old functional network will have mental states
p. 87 p.87 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
1984 works
p.153 A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Rey]
1990 Inverted Earth
p.132 The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Rowlands]
1998 Semantics, Conceptual Role
p.955 The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions