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Ideas of Sydney Shoemaker, by Text

[American, b.1931, Professor at Cornell University.]

1959 Personal Identity and Memory
4 p.127 If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too
5 p.129 Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [PG]
1969 Time Without Change
p.247 If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Lowe]
p.52 p.52 Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal
p.54 p.54 People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared
p.56 p.56 If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years
p.58 p.58 Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal
p.59 p.59 We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep
p.63 p.63 If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause
1980 Causality and Properties
p.53 Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Bird]
p.56 Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Ellis]
01 p.207 If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved
02 p.207 Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes
02 p.209 Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things
02 p.209 A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers
03 p.210 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional
03 p.211 One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties
03 p.211 Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties
03 p.211 Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties
04 p.212 Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects
04 p.212 The identity of a property concerns its causal powers
04 p.213 Properties are clusters of conditional powers
04 p.214 Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same
04 p.214 We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions
05 p.214 Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them
05 p.215 Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing?
05 p.216 If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination
05 p.217 It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality
05 p.218 There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity
05 p.218 Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world
06 p.219 Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
06 p.220 To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
07 p.222 One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance
07 p.222 Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction
07 p.222 The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts
08 p.222 If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds
09 p.225 If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity
09 p.226 If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties
10 p.231 It is possible to conceive what is not possible
10 p.231 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know?
11 p.233 Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects
I p.409 Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker]
1994 Introspection
p.395 p.395 For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events?
p.396 p.396 Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible
p.398 p.398 The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly'
1998 Causal and Metaphysical Necessity
I p.408 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths
I p.409 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws
III p.412 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic
III p.413 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity
III p.413 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green
III p.415 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds
VI p.423 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible
VI p.423 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility
VI p.424 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence
VII p.425 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity
1999 Self, Body and Coincidence
p.297 p.3 Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Mumford/Anjum]