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Ideas of Michael Williams, by Text

[British, fl. 1989, Graduate of Oxford. Professor at Yale University.]

2001 Problems of Knowledge
Ch. 1 p.21 Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
Ch. 1 p.23 Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
Ch. 1 p.26 We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
Ch. 2 p.29 In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
Ch. 2 p.30 How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
Ch. 2 p.31 Externalism does not require knowing that you know
Ch. 2 p.33 Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
Ch. 2 p.36 Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
Ch. 5 p.61 Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
Ch. 7 p.85 Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
Ch. 7 p.88 Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
Ch. 8 p.96 Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
Ch. 8 p.97 Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
Ch. 8 p.97 Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
Ch. 8 p.98 Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
Ch. 8 p.100 Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
Ch.10 p.118 Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
Ch.10 p.119 Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
Ch.10 p.122 Only a belief can justify a belief
Ch.10 p.123 Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
Ch.10 p.124 Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
Ch.11 p.129 Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
Ch.11 p.135 Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
Ch.11 p.136 We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
Ch.12 p.138 Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
Ch.12 p.140 The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
Ch.13 p.148 Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
Ch.13 p.154 What works always takes precedence over theories
Ch.18 p.215 Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
2005 Without Immediate Justification
1 p.204 Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist
2 p.206 Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification
3 p.207 In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option
4 p.210 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
4 p.213 Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed