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Ideas of Peter F. Strawson, by Text
[British, 1919 - 2006, Father of Galen Strawson. Professor at Oxford University.]
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p.37
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6413
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'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Grayling]
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p.402
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10430
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Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Sainsbury]
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p.535
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10448
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If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach]
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§1
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p.65
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8354
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Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion
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§2
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p.68
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8355
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Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer
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§2
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p.68
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8356
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The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert
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§2
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p.70
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8357
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If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something
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§5
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p.85
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8358
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There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist
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§1
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p.449
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10841
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The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement
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§2
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p.452
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10842
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The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world
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§2
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p.453
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10843
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Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say
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§2
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p.453
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10844
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The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining
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1959
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Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics
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Intro
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p.9
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7921
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Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy
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Intro
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p.9
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7920
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Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure
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Intro
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p.10
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7922
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Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories
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3.4
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p.100
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9282
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I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others
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3.4
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p.101
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9263
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A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality
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3.4 n1
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p.99
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9281
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The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied
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I
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p.34
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16979
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It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual
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I n4
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p.38
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16980
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We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use
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