| 1958 | Proper Names |
| p.89 | p.89 | 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) |
| p.91 | p.91 | 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? |
| p.93 | p.93 | 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' |
| p.94 | p.94 | 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions |
| p.96 | p.96 | 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way |
| 1984 | Minds, Brains and Science |
| p.322 | 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Chalmers] |
| p.438 | 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett] |
| p.439 | 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett] |
| 1992 | The Rediscovery of the Mind |
| p.7 | 9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Kriegel/Williford] |
| Intro | p.-6 | 3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality |
| Intro | p.-6 | 3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind |
| Intro | p.-5 | 3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields |
| Intro | p.-5 | 3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism |
| Ch. 1.I | p.2 | 3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling |
| Ch. 1.IV | p.14 | 3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property |
| Ch. 1.V.4 | p.22 | 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation |
| Ch. 1.V.5 | p.23 | 3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily |
| Ch. 1.V.6 | p.24 | 3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit |
| Ch. 2 App | p.59 | 3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it |
| Ch. 2.VIII | p.49 | 3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference |
| Ch. 3.IV | p.77 | 3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds |
| Ch. 3.IV | p.80 | 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' |
| Ch. 3.IV | p.81 | 3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it |
| Ch. 4.1 | p.84 | 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself |
| Ch. 4.I | p.83 | 3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories |
| Ch. 4.II | p.98 | 3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense |
| Ch. 4.II | p.99 | 3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity |
| Ch. 4.III | p.105 | 3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same |
| Ch. 4.III | p.108 | 3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better |
| Ch. 5.I | p.111 | 3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations |
| Ch. 5.I | p.112 | 3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation |
| Ch. 5.II | p.113 | 3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes |
| Ch. 5.II.5 | p.115 | 3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? |
| Ch. 5.III | p.118 | 3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism |
| Ch. 5.V | p.124 | 3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect |
| Ch. 5.V | p.125 | 3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism |
| Ch. 5.V | p.126 | 3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston |
| Ch. 5.V | p.126 | 3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant |
| Ch. 5.V | p.204 | 3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin] |
| Ch. 5.V | p.205 | 3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Maslin] |
| Ch. 6 | p.127 | 3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial |
| Ch. 6.I.2 | p.130 | 3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time |
| Ch. 6.I.5 | p.132 | 3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality |
| Ch. 6.I.7 | p.136 | 3482 | Perception is a function of expectation |
| Ch. 6.II.2 | p.144 | 3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision |
| Ch. 7.II.1 | p.156 | 3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality |
| Ch. 7.II.4 | p.158 | 3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component |
| Ch. 7.II.7 | p.160 | 3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones |
| Ch. 7.III | p.163 | 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained |
| Ch. 8.I | p.175 | 3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background |
| Ch. 8.I | p.176 | 3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs |
| Ch. 8.I | p.176 | 3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background |
| Ch. 8.II | p.181 | 3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning |
| Ch. 8.III | p.187 | 3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance |
| Ch. 8.III | p.189 | 3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation |
| Ch. 8.V | p.194 | 3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard |
| Ch. 9.II | p.200 | 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese |
| Ch. 9.V | p.207 | 3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it |
| Ch. 9.V | p.210 | 3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena |
| Ch. 9.VI | p.212 | 3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness |
| Ch. 9.VI | p.213 | 3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? |
| Ch. 9.VI | p.214 | 3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? |
| Ch.10.I | p.227 | 3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating |
| Ch.10.II | p.228 | 3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information |
| Ch.10.II | p.229 | 3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour |
| Ch.10.III | p.238 | 3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do |
| Ch.10.IV | p.240 | 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent |
| Ch.10.IV | p.244 | 3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything |
| Ch.10.V | p.248 | 3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry |
| 1997 | The Mystery of Consciousness |
| Ch.1 | p.5 | 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot |
| Ch.1 | p.7 | 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity |
| Ch.1 | p.8 | 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate |
| Ch.1 | p.14 | 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder |
| Ch.1 | p.18 | 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property |
| Ch.2 | p.29 | 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation |
| Ch.2 | p.33 | 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' |
| Ch.5 App | p.120 | 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint |
| Concl 2.10 | p.212 | 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something |
| Concl 2.10 | p.212 | 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets |
| Concl 2.5 | p.206 | 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings |
| Concl 2.6 | p.206 | 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons |
| Concl.1 | p.200 | 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't |
| 2001 | Rationality in Action |
| Ch.1.II | p.13 | 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will |
| Ch.1.II | p.19 | 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic |
| Ch.1.II | p.21 | 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax |
| Ch.1.II | p.21 | 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity |
| Ch.1.II | p.23 | 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality |
| Ch.1.II | p.29 | 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something |
| Ch.1.II | p.31 | 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it |
| Ch.1.II | p.32 | 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action |
| Ch.2 | p.36 | 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) |
| Ch.3.II | p.65 | 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action |
| Ch.3.II | p.66 | 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective |
| Ch.3.IX | p.93 | 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't |
| Ch.3.IX | p.93 | 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness |
| Ch.3.IX | p.93 | 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced |
| Ch.3.IX | p.94 | 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" |
| Ch.3.VII | p.84 | 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally |
| Ch.3.VII | p.86 | 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self |
| Ch.3.VII | p.90 | 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity |
| Ch.3.VII | p.90 | 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason |
| Ch.3.VIII | p.92 | 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action |
| Ch.3.X | p.95 | 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible |
| Ch.4 | p.99 | 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it |
| Ch.4.I | p.102 | 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states |
| Ch.4.I | p.107 | 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) |
| Ch.4.III | p.119 | 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth |
| Ch.5.II | p.145 | 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self |
| Ch.5.II | p.148 | 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it |
| Ch.5.IV | p.160 | 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men |
| Ch.6 App | p.215 | 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act |
| Ch.6.II | p.184 | 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth |
| Ch.6.IV | p.198 | 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution |
| Ch.8.II | p.245 | 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable |
| Ch.9 n5 | p.293 | 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings |
| Int xiv | p.-3 | 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression |