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Ideas of Roger Scruton, by Text

[British, b.1944, Born High Wycombe; Royal Grammar School there. Birkbeck, London and University of Boston. Retired to write. Noted conservative controversialist.]

1976 Representation in Music
p.63-4 p.63 12166 If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language
p.71 p.71 12167 Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression
p.74 p.74 12168 Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it
1980 Recent Aesthetics in England and America
p.13 p.13 12158 Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer
p.3 p.3 12156 Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism
1981 The Nature of Musical Expression
p.49 p.49 12164 Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing
p.54 p.54 12165 Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings
1981 Short History of Modern Philosophy
Bibliog p.291 5660 Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights
Ch.14 p.199 5653 A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice
Ch.4 p.44 5636 Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions
Ch.4 p.45 5637 Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions
1982 A Dictionary of Political Thought
'abortion' p.1 7587 The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it
'allegiance' p.12 7588 Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society
'altruism' p.14 7589 Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me)
'consequentialism' p.89 7590 Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality
'law' p.259 7592 For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content
'liberalism' p.269 7593 Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [PG]
'paradox of democracy' p.341 7594 Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter
'rights' p.409 7595 The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people
1982 Laughter
§1 p.152 12169 Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason
§12 p.165 12174 Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern
§5 p.156 12170 Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity
§7 p.159 12172 Objects of amusement do not have to be real
§9 p.163 12173 The central object of amusement is the human
1982 Public Text and Common Reader
p.15 p.15 12159 Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story
p.18 p.18 12160 In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not
p.24 p.24 12161 We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions
p.25 p.25 12162 In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning
p.27 p.27 12163 Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant
1993 Upon Nothing: Swansea lecture
p.9 8989 The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings
p.2 p.2 8987 On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away
p.29 p.29 8992 Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive
p.7 p.6 8988 Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology
p.9 p.9 8990 So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed
1994 Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey
1.1 p.6 3878 Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths?
1.2 p.7 3879 Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything
3.2 p.25 3880 Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion
4 p.41 3881 In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness
5.3 p.54 3882 Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private
9.1 p.99 3883 A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition
9.4 p.106 3884 The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
10.1 p.114 3885 We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities
11.2 p.127 3886 Membership is the greatest source of obligation
13.2 p.162 3887 Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori
13.5 p.168 3888 Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re
14 p.173 3890 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation
15.7 p.194 3891 If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p
17.1 p.228 3892 Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same
20.1 p.273 3894 We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good
20.6 p.290 3895 The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers
20.6 p.291 3896 Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in
22 p.317 3897 Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge
22.4 p.322 3898 My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
23.3 p.334 3899 The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states
24 p.341 3901 Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities
25 p.355 3903 The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable
25.3 p.360 3904 Measuring space requires no movement while I do it
26.2 p.386 3905 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance
26.4 p.392 3906 If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
26.6 p.394 3907 Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects?
26.7 p.395 3908 If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs
Ch.10 n p.524 3910 If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities?
Ch.16 n p.539 3911 The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence
1996 Animal Rights and Wrongs
p.104 p.104 4295 We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens
p.107 p.107 4296 Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher
p.13 p.13 4263 Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals
p.14 p.14 4264 Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation
p.15 p.15 4266 Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise
p.15 p.15 4265 If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them
p.16 p.16 4267 Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind
p.16 p.16 4268 Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality
p.17 p.17 4269 An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling
p.19 p.19 4270 Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason?
p.23 p.23 4271 There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity
p.28 p.28 4272 Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law
p.30 p.30 4273 Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement
p.33 p.33 4274 The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty
p.39 p.39 4276 An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name
p.41 p.41 4277 I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit
p.43 p.43 4278 Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators
p.44 p.44 4279 We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it
p.50 p.50 4280 Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people
p.52 p.52 4281 Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke
p.52 p.52 4282 Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate
p.54 p.54 4283 Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does
p.56 p.56 4284 All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence
p.59 p.59 4285 As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts
p.61 p.61 4286 Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict
p.63 p.63 4287 Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent
p.75 p.75 4288 Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them
p.81 p.81 4289 Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death
p.86 p.86 4290 That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done
p.87 p.87 4291 Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different
p.87 p.87 4292 Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem
p.91 p.91 4293 Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate
p.97 p.97 4294 Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them
2011 Beauty: a very short introduction
1 p.3 18541 Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value
1 p.4 18542 Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition
1 p.7 18543 Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction?
1 p.11 18544 Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony
1 p.26 18546 The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing
2 p.55 18548 Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong
5 p.90 18550 Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially
5 p.105 18551 Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern
7 p.123 18553 Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment
7 p.137 18554 Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one
9 p.163 18556 Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection