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Ideas of Hilary Putnam, by Text

[American, 1926 - 2016, Taught at Princeton, then MIT, then Professor at Harvard University.]

1963 Brains and Behaviour
p.35 3460 Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Searle]
1967 Mathematics without Foundations
p.295 9937 I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations'
p.302 9941 Science requires more than consistency of mathematics
p.305 9943 You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it!
p.303 p.303 9940 Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it
p.303 p.303 9939 It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed
p.308 p.308 9944 We understand some statements about all sets
1967 The Mental Life of Some Machines
p.6 5495 Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Lycan]
1967 The Thesis that Mathematics is Logic
p.125 10066 Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Musgrave]
1968 The Nature of Mental States
p.24 6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger]
p.120 2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Kim]
p.52 p.52 2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
p.54 p.54 2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism?
p.55 p.55 2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions
p.57 p.57 2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all
p.57 p.57 2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them
p.58 p.58 2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour
1971 The Philosophy of Logic
p.346 p.105 18199 Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets
p.347 p.105 18200 Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit
p.57 p.197 8857 We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence
1971 Philosophy of Logic
Ch.1 p.5 18949 The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses
Ch.2 p.14 18950 Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors
Ch.2 p.21 18951 For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory
Ch.3 p.26 18952 '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)'
Ch.3 p.26 18953 Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises
Ch.3 p.27 18954 Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations
Ch.3 p.28 18955 Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless
Ch.3 p.32 18956 Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes
Ch.5 p.36 18957 Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist
Ch.6 p.48 18958 In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type
Ch.7 p.56 18959 Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit
Ch.8 p.72 18960 Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory
Ch.9 p.75 18961 We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions
Ch.9 p.76 18962 Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation
1973 Explanation and Reference
p.169 11904 Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Mackie,P]
p.180 11908 Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P]
II B p.204 17505 Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions
II C p.205 17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected
II C p.205 17507 Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum)
III B p.212 17508 Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity'
1973 Meaning and Reference
p.154 p.154 9168 I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else
p.156 p.156 5817 Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer
p.159 p.159 5818 If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O
p.159 p.159 5819 Conceivability is no proof of possibility
p.160 p.160 5820 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here
p.160 p.160 9169 A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent
p.161 p.161 9170 We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference
1975 The Meaning of 'Meaning'
p.16 11192 If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Williams,NE]
p.122 4099 If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Crane]
p.184 18890 Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N]
p.196 12026 We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G]
p.242 3208 Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Rey]
p.247 7705 The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette]
p.263 3893 Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Scruton]
p.235 p.235 11190 Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff
p.241 p.241 11191 The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds
1975 What is Mathematical Truth?
p.70 p.241 10269 Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets
1977 Models and Reality
p.109 13655 The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Shapiro]
p.421 p.421 9913 The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language
p.424 p.424 9914 It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature
p.425 p.425 9915 V = L just says all sets are constructible
1978 Meaning and the Moral Sciences
Intro p.2 6264 In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
Intro p.4 6265 Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
Intro p.4 6266 We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science
Intro p.5 6267 A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science'
Lec II.2 p.23 6268 The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
Lec II.5 p.30 6269 Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
Lec III p.41 6270 The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour
Lec V p.58 6271 How reference is specified is not what reference is
Lec VI p.73 6272 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science
Lec VI p.74 6273 Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough
Lec VI p.75 6274 Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion
p. 41-2 p.21 17084 You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects
Pt Four p.122 6280 Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language
Pt Four p.129 6282 Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference
Pt Four p.129 6281 Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation
Pt Four p.135 6283 Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways)
Pt Four p.137 6284 If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true?
Pt Three p.101 6275 You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs
Pt Three p.108 6276 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
Pt Three p.110 6277 Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible
Pt Three p.110 6278 We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning
Pt Three p.115 6279 A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning
1979 Phil of Mathematics: why nothing works
Modalism p.508 3663 How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them?
1980 What is innate and why
p.407 p.407 2605 If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate!
p.408 p.408 2606 No machine language can express generalisations
1980 works
p.59 22181 Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Okasha]
p.141 6782 Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle
1981 Why there isn't a ready-made world
'Causation' p.211 17644 Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory
'Causation' p.214 17645 An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire
'Failure' p.226 17648 It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality
'Intro' p.205 17642 The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty
'Intro' p.206 17643 Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay'
1981 Reason, Truth and History
p.73 14214 If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Lewis]
p.73 4714 Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [O'Grady]
p.75 4716 The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [O'Grady]
p.83 4718 If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [O'Grady]
p.139 7624 The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values
Pref p.-3 7610 A fact is simply what it is rational to accept
Pref p.-2 7611 Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing
Ch.1 p.18 7612 Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
Ch.1 p.21 7613 Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
Ch.2 p.23 14200 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this
Ch.2 p.24 14201 Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term
Ch.2 p.25 14202 Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference
Ch.2 p.27 14203 Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same
Ch.2 p.29 14204 Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change
Ch.2 p.33 14205 The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree
Ch.2 p.35 14206 There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct'
Ch.2 p.44 14207 If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth
Ch.3 p.55 7616 Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
Ch.3 p.56 7617 Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth
Ch.3 p.69 7618 Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
Ch.5 p.124 7620 Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself
Ch.6 p.132 7623 For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value
1981 Why Reason Can't be Naturalized
p.315 8828 Truth is rational acceptability
1988 Representation and Reality
§1 p.08 p.8 2334 Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms
§1 p.09 p.9 2335 Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation
§1 p.09 p.9 2336 Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible
§2 p.22 p.22 2338 Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts
§2 p.25 p.25 2339 Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't
§2 p.32 p.32 2343 Reference may be different while mental representation is the same
§2 p.38 p.38 2340 We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content
§3 p.49 p.49 2341 Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference
§3 p.50 p.50 2342 "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description
§4 p.60 p.60 2344 If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic
§4 p.66 p.66 2345 Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation
§4 p.67 p.67 2346 Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference
§4 p.68 p.68 2347 Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement
§5 p.84 p.84 2348 Is there just one computational state for each specific belief?
§7 p.107 p.107 2349 Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique
§7 p.110 p.110 2351 Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved
§7 p.112 p.112 2352 The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions
§7 p.119 p.119 2354 "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning
Int p.xii p.-7 2331 Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction
Int p.xiv p.-5 2332 Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic
p.7 p.7 2074 Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology?
p.73 p.73 2071 If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology