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Ideas of Ray Monk, by Text

[British, fl. 1985, At Southampton University.]

1996 Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude
Ch.19 n6 p.533 If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing
     Full Idea: Whether the words 'belief' and 'judgement' mean the same thing is a moot point. Traditionally, a judgement is the assent of mind to a proposition. If one thinks that all beliefs are propositional, then beliefs and judgements are the same thing.
     From: Ray Monk (Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude [1996], Ch.19 n6)
     A reaction: If I think I have put a bit too much toothpaste on my brush, that strikes me as a non-propositional judgement, even though it could be spelled out as a proposition. But it also strikes me as a belief.
2001 Interview with Baggini and Stangroom
p.14 p.14 Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency
     Full Idea: One of the most conspicuous things about Wittgenstein is that, on the ethics side, he pared his life down to the minimum, so as to make as central as possible his search for decency, the drive to be a decent person.
     From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.14)
     A reaction: It rather looks as if decency was quite an effort for him, as he had a rather waspish temperament, and people found it hard to get close to him. On the whole, though, he sounds like good company, as do nearly all the great philosophers.
p.16 p.16 We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting
     Full Idea: We encourage students to be concerned with whether an argument is valid or not, and we don't encourage them much to consider the question of whether the argument is interesting or not.
     From: Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.16)
     A reaction: What do you make of arguments which are very interesting, but (unfortunately) totally invalid? That said, this is a nice comment. A philosopher cannot contemplate too long or too deeply on the question of what is really 'interesting'.