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Ideas of Rom Harré, by Text
[British, fl. 1970, At Oxford University.]
1
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p.9
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15860
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We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws
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1
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p.10
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15862
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Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures
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1
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p.11
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15864
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Classification is just as important as laws in natural science
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1
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p.22
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15865
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Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces
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1
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p.34
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15867
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Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature
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1
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p.35
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15868
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Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out
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1
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p.37
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15869
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Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature
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2
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p.39
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15872
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Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local?
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2
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p.39
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15871
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Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities?
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2
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p.39
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15870
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Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three?
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2
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p.44
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15874
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Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them
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2
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p.46
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15875
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In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them
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2
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p.48
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15876
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Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties?
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3
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p.59
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15878
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Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range
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3
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p.62
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15879
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The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair
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3
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p.67
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15880
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In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered
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3
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p.75
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15881
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We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions
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3
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p.78
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15882
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Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them
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4
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p.87
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15884
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Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged
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4
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p.100
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15885
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The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism
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5
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p.102
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15886
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Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds
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5
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p.103
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15887
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'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour
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5
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p.105
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15888
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The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science
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5
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p.110
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15889
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It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected
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5
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p.111
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15890
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Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black'
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5
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p.111
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15891
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Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions
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5
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p.114
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15892
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Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms
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