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Ideas of Gilbert Harman, by Text

[American, b.1938, Professor at Princeton University.]

1970 Induction
§IV p.150 8800 If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Sosa]
1973 Thought
p.81 6369 In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Pollock/Cruz]
Pref p.-4 3073 We see ourselves in the world as a map
2.2 p.28 3074 People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious
3.2 p.38 3075 Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern?
3.3 p.41 3076 Defining dispositions is circular
3.6 p.47 3077 Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge
4.3 p.61 3078 Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory
5.1 p.71 3079 Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions
5.2 p.75 3080 Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements
5.2 p.76 3081 A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form
5.3 p.78 3082 Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form
5.4 p.81 3083 Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely
6.3 p.92 3084 Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts
6.4 p.94 3085 Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition
6.5 p.97 3086 Are there any meanings apart from in a language?
6.5 p.98 3087 The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary
6.7 p.104 3088 Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination
6.7 p.105 3089 Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic
6.8 p.109 3090 There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning
7.2 p.119 3092 If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false
8.1 p.127 3093 Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction
10.1 p.157 3094 You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument
10.2 p.159 3095 Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations
10.4 p.164 3096 Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations
10.4 p.166 3097 We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence
10.4 p.168 3098 Deductive logic is the only logic there is
11.2 p.179 3099 Inference is never a conscious process
12.1 p.189 3100 You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference
12.1 p.190 3101 Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred
1974 The Inference to the Best Explanation
p.1 17060 Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Smart]
1983 Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty
9.2.1 p.156 5120 What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values
9.2.2 p.156 5121 Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it
1986 Change in View: Principles of Reasoning
1 p.4 19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views
1 p.5 19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic
1 p.8 19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence
2 p.12 19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities
2 p.15 19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it
2 p.19 19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it
2 p.20 19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate
3 p.23 19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions
4 p.29 19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence
7 p.65 19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another
1987 (Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics
12.1 p.206 12589 Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
12.1 p.206 12588 Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality
12.1.1 p.207 12590 Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication
12.1.2 p.208 12592 Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication
12.1.2 p.208 12591 Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication
12.1.3 p.3 12593 The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences
12.1.4 p.210 12594 If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?
12.2.2 p.212 12596 Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence
12.2.2 p.212 12595 We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning
12.2.2 p.213 12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely
12.2.4 p.215 12598 Reality is the overlap of true complete theories
12.2.6 p.217 12599 Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them
12.3.3 p.221 12600 The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
12.3.3 p.223 12601 The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
12.3.4 p.224 12602 There is no natural border between inner and outer
12.3.4 p.226 12603 We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world
1990 The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
p.459 8130 Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Burge]
1995 Rationality
1.2 p.22 6950 You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies
1.3 p.23 6951 Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are
1.4.5 p.31 6952 Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it
1.4.5 p.32 6953 All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication
1.5.2 p.33 6954 A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs
1.5.2 p.34 6955 Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation
1999 Moral Philosophy meets social psychology
10.1 p.165 5122 Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it
10.1 p.165 5123 Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it
10.2 p.167 5124 If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait
10.7.1.1 p.176 5125 Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character