| 1999 | Response to David Armstrong |
| p.42 | p.139 | 18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers |
| 2001 | Scientific Essentialism |
| Intro | p.2 | 13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton |
| Intro | p.8 | 13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science |
| Intro | p.10 | 13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure |
| Intro | p.10 | 13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds |
| Intro | p.11 | 13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences |
| Intro | p.11 | 13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership |
| 1.01 | p.18 | 13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals |
| 1.01 | p.19 | 13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind |
| 1.02 | p.21 | 13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences |
| 1.05 | p.31 | 13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial |
| 1.06 | p.33 | 13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities |
| 1.09 | p.46 | 13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape |
| 1.10 | p.48 | 13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists |
| 1.11 | p.50 | 13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds |
| 1.12 | p.53 | 13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do |
| 1.12 | p.55 | 13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) |
| 2.03 | p.68 | 13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate |
| 2.05 | p.81 | 13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred |
| 2.07 | p.87 | 13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property |
| 3.05 | p.115 | 13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions |
| 3.06 | p.119 | 13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures |
| 3.06 | p.120 | 13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way |
| 3.09 | p.127 | 13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties |
| 3.09 | p.128 | 13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world |
| 3.09 | p.128 | 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces |
| 3.11 | p.132 | 13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) |
| 3.11 | p.132 | 13597 | Good explanations unify |
| 3.11 | p.135 | 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation |
| 4.03 | p.153 | 13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential |
| 4.05 | p.160 | 13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures |
| 7.06 | p.241 | 13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible |
| 7.06 | p.242 | 13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind |
| 75,92 | p.112 | 9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it |
| 8.04 | p.269 | 13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic |
| 8.09 | p.283 | 13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved |
| 2002 | The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism |
| Intro | p.3 | 5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside |
| Intro | p.3 | 5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents |
| Intro | p.7 | 5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable |
| Ch.1 | p.12 | 5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to |
| Ch.1 | p.14 | 5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical |
| Ch.1 | p.15 | 5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things |
| Ch.1 | p.16 | 5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way |
| Ch.3 | p.41 | 5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction |
| Ch.3 | p.43 | 5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [PG] |
| Ch.3 | p.43 | 5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent |
| Ch.3 | p.47 | 5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional |
| Ch.3 | p.48 | 5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws |
| Ch.3 | p.49 | 5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once |
| Ch.3 | p.54 | 5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell |
| Ch.3 | p.56 | 5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate |
| Ch.4 | p.59 | 5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances |
| Ch.4 | p.59 | 5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds |
| Ch.4 | p.60 | 5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass |
| Ch.4 | p.68 | 5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [PG] |
| Ch.4 | p.70 | 5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions |
| Ch.5 | p.82 | 5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws |
| Ch.5 | p.82 | 5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures |
| Ch.5 | p.85 | 5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds |
| Ch.5 | p.91 | 5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances |
| Ch.5 | p.92 | 5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws |
| Ch.6 | p.109 | 5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori |
| Ch.6 | p.113 | 5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else |
| Ch.6 | p.114 | 5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility |
| Ch.6 | p.115 | 5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible |
| Ch.6 | p.120 | 5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws |
| Ch.7 | p.126 | 5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects |
| Ch.7 | p.129 | 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals |
| Ch.7 | p.131 | 5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world |
| Ch.7 | p.135 | 5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour |
| Ch.7 | p.137 | 5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue |
| Ch.7 | p.138 | 5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language |
| Ch.7 | p.138 | 5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology |
| Ch.7 | p.141 | 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency |
| Ch.7 | p.143 | 5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions |
| Ch.7 | p.156 | 5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right |
| Ch.7 | p.161 | 5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved |
| 2005 | Katzav on limitations of dispositions |
| p.91 | 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence |
| 90 | p.90 | 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties |
| 91 | p.90 | 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations |
| 91 | p.91 | 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws |
| 91 | p.91 | 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus |
| 2009 | The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism |
| Intro | p.2 | 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers |
| 1 | p.14 | 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation |
| 1 | p.18 | 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability |
| 1 | p.19 | 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true |
| 2 | p.25 | 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them |
| 2 | p.39 | 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy |
| 2 | p.42 | 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal |
| 2 | p.44 | 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act |
| 2 | p.44 | 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals |
| 2 | p.45 | 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism |
| 3 | p.54 | 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave |
| 3 | p.55 | 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power |
| 3 | p.58 | 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties |
| 3 | p.59 | 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level |
| 3 | p.60 | 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes |
| 3 | p.63 | 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions |
| 3 | p.68 | 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes |
| 3 | p.70 | 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal |
| 3 n8 | p.70 | 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent |
| 5 | p.93 | 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties |
| 6 | p.116 | 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things |
| 6 | p.117 | 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things |
| 6 | p.124 | 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang |
| 6 | p.127 | 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang |