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Ideas of Harré,R./Madden,E.H., by Text

[British, fl. 1975, Associated with Oxford University.]

1975 Causal Powers
1.I.A p.1 15209 Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life
1.I.A p.2 15210 Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations
1.I.A p.2 15211 There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical
1.I.A p.3 15212 Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know
1.I.A p.5 15213 Causation always involves particular productive things
1.I.B p.6 15214 Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise
1.I.B p.7 15215 Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews
1.II.A p.10 15216 Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature?
1.II.B p.12 15217 Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity
1.II.C p.12 15218 Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions
1.II.C p.13 15220 To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction
1.II.C p.13 15219 Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers
1.II.C p.14 15221 The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity
1.II.C p.14 15222 Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity
1.III.B p.15 15223 Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world
1.III.C p.16 15224 A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual
1.IV p.17 15225 Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances
1.IV p.17 15226 What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori
1.IV p.18 15228 Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori
1.IV p.18 15227 Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates
1.V p.19 15229 We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it
1.V.B p.19 15230 Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement
1.V.B p.20 15231 Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature
1.V.B p.20 15232 Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation
1.V.B p.20 15233 If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary
1.V.C p.21 15234 There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further
1.VI p.22 15235 There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence
2.I p.28 15236 Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences
2.II p.30 15237 Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars
2.II p.32 15238 Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples
2.II p.33 15239 We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence
2.II p.37 15240 In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds
3.I p.45 15241 Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory
3.I p.48 15242 Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature
3.II p.51 15243 We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions
3.II p.55 15244 We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own
3.II p.56 15245 It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience
3.II p.57 15246 Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself
3.II p.59 15248 Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous
3.II p.66 15252 If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite
3.II p.66 15253 If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power'
4.I p.71 15255 Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions
4.I p.71 15254 If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour
4.II p.75 15256 Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river'
4.II p.76 15257 The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events
5.II p.85 15258 Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation
5.VI p.96 15259 Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum
5.VII p.98 15260 Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have
6. Intro p.101 15261 Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement
6.I p.101 15262 In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is
6.II p.103 15263 Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2
6.II p.104 15264 The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this
6.III p.108 15265 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions
6.III p.109 15266 We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things
6.IV p.109 15268 Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects
6.IV p.109 15267 Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations)
6.IV p.110 15270 Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction
6.IV p.110 15269 Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations
6.IV p.110 15271 If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another
6.IV p.111 15273 Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous'
6.IV p.111 15274 Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut
6.IV p.111 15275 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time
6.IV p.111 15272 The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing
6.IV p.114 15278 Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together
6.IV p.114 15277 The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved
6.IV p.115 15279 Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball
6.IV p.116 15280 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped
6.V p.113 15276 Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released
7.3 p.128 15286 Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse
7.I p.118 15281 Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected
7.I p.120 15283 Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities
7.I p.123 15284 Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates
7.I p.124 15285 The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters
7.III p.129 15287 The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness
7.III p.129 15288 People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent
7.III p.130 15289 Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms
7.IV p.131 15290 What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity
7.V p.132 15291 There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given)
7.V p.134 15293 If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity
7.V p.134 15292 We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity
7.V p.135 15294 Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity
7.VI p.138 15295 Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results
8.II p.143 15296 A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity
8.III p.149 15297 We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature
8.III p.149 15298 We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars
8.IV p.150 15300 Fundamental particulars can't change
8.IV p.150 15299 Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds
8.V p.151 15301 The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised
8.VII p.154 15302 We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers
8.VII p.155 15303 Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers
8.VII p.155 15304 We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate
9.I p.162 15305 Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity)
9.I p.163 15306 Only changes require explanation
9.II.B p.172 15310 Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction
9.II.B p.172 15309 The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies
9.III p.175 15315 What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events?
9.III p.177 15317 Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real
9.III p.177 15316 The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal
9.III p.178 15318 Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material
9.IV p.180 15319 Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things
9.IV p.180 15320 Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging
9.IV p.181 15321 Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places