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Ideas of Michael Jubien, by Text

[American, fl. 1992, Professor at the University of Florida.]

1977 Ontology and Mathematical Truth
p.111 p.111 9962 How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations?
p.111 p.111 9963 If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed
p.112 p.112 9964 Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own
p.113 p.113 9965 There couldn't just be one number, such as 17
p.115 p.115 9966 The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure
p.116 p.116 9967 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not
p.117 p.117 9968 A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities
p.118 n8 p.118 9969 The empty set is the purest abstract object
2007 Analyzing Modality
1 p.99 11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
1 p.100 11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
1 p.100 11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
1 p.100 11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
1 p.100 11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
1 p.102 11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
1 p.104 11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
1 p.105 11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
1 p.105 11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
2 p.107 11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
2 p.110 11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
2 p.111 11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
4 p.122 11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
5 p.124 11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
2009 Possibility
Intro p.-5 13374 To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
Intro p.-4 13375 The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
Intro p.-3 13376 We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
Intro p.-1 13378 It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
Intro p.-1 13377 First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects
1.3 p.13 13379 If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
1.4 p.15 13380 Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
1.4 p.16 13381 Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
1.4 p.17 13382 Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
1.4 p.19 13383 If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
1.5 p.23 13384 Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
1.5 p.32 13385 Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
1.5 p.33 13386 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
2.3 p.47 13388 It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
3.2 p.67 13389 The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
3.2 p.75 13390 Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
3.2 p.77 13391 Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
4.1 p.85 13392 Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
4.2 p.88 13393 Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
4.4 p.92 13394 Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
4.5 p.95 13395 If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
4.5 p.97 13396 Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
5.1 p.124 13398 We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
5.1 p.127 13399 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
5.2 p.129 13400 If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
5.2 n9 p.129 13401 The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
5.3 p.134 13402 We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
5.3 p.136 13403 The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
6.4 p.173 13404 To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
7 p.179 13405 The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category