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Ideas of Michael Jubien, by Text

[American, fl. 1992, Professor at the University of Florida.]

1977 Ontology and Mathematical Truth
p.111 p.111 If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed
p.111 p.111 How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations?
p.112 p.112 Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own
p.113 p.113 There couldn't just be one number, such as 17
p.115 p.115 The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure
p.116 p.116 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not
p.117 p.117 A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities
p.118 n8 p.118 The empty set is the purest abstract object
2007 Analyzing Modality
1 p.99 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
1 p.100 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
1 p.100 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
1 p.100 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
1 p.100 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
1 p.102 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
1 p.104 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
1 p.105 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
1 p.105 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
2 p.107 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
2 p.110 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
2 p.111 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
4 p.122 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
5 p.124 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
2009 Possibility
Intro p.-5 To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
Intro p.-4 The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
Intro p.-3 We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
Intro p.-1 It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
Intro p.-1 First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects
1.3 p.13 If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
1.4 p.15 Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
1.4 p.16 Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
1.4 p.17 Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
1.4 p.19 If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
1.5 p.23 Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
1.5 p.32 Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
1.5 p.33 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
2.3 p.47 It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
3.2 p.67 The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
3.2 p.75 Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
3.2 p.77 Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
4.1 p.85 Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
4.2 p.88 Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
4.4 p.92 Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
4.5 p.95 If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
4.5 p.97 Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
5.1 p.124 We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
5.1 p.127 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
5.2 p.129 If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
5.2 n9 p.129 The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
5.3 p.134 We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
5.3 p.136 The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
6.4 p.173 To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
7 p.179 The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category