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Ideas of JP Burgess / G Rosen, by Text

[American, fl. 1997, Both professors at Princeton University.]

1997 A Subject with No Object
I.A.1.a p.14 Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree
I.A.1.b p.17 The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities
I.A.2.c p.43 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
II.A.1 p.102 If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity
II.B.3.a p.137 We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers
II.B.3.b p.141 Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility
II.C.0 p.147 Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together
II.C.1.a p.150 A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets
II.C.1.b p.153 Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction
II.C.1.b p.156 Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates
III.A.1.d p.179 Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'
III.B.2.c p.199 Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas
III.C.1.b p.223 The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory
III.C.1.b p.224 The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set
III.C.2.a p.228 Number words became nouns around the time of Plato