| 2001 | Truth |
| 5.1 | p.90 | 14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences |
| 5.1 | p.91 | 14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) |
| 5.2 | p.101 | 14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate |
| 5.4.2 | p.109 | 14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true |
| 2008 | Definitions |
| Intro | p.1 | 11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) |
| 1 | p.2 | 11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity |
| 1.1 | p.3 | 11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage |
| 1.2 | p.3 | 11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable |
| 1.3 | p.4 | 11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings |
| 1.4 | p.5 | 11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate |
| 1.5 | p.5 | 11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning |
| 2 | p.6 | 11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' |
| 2.2 | p.9 | 11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive |
| 2.4 | p.12 | 11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds |
| 2.4 | p.13 | 11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability |
| 2.7 | p.20 | 11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output |