green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of R Keefe / P Smith, by Text

[British, fl. 1997, both of Cambridge University.]

1997 Intro: Theories of Vagueness
1 p.2 If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question
1 p.2 Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change
1 p.5 Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement
1 p.6 The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics
1 p.7 Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise
1 p.7 A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1
1 p.15 If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness
2 p.19 The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary
3 p.23 Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail
3 p.30 Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism
3 p.32 The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical
3 p.33 Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise
4 p.43 People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are
4 p.46 If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall'
4 p.47 How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321?
5 p.51 Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature
5 p.55 S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P)