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Ideas of J Pollock / J Cruz, by Text

[American, fl. 1999, Collaborators on a book on epistemology]

1999 Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)
Pref p.-4 6346 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist
§1.2 p.10 6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively
§1.4.6 p.19 6352 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion
§1.5.3 p.25 6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
§1.5.3 p.25 6355 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
§1.5.3 p.25 6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
§2.1 p.29 6357 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs
§2.3.1 p.36 6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
§2.3.3.2 p.40 6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
§2.3.3.3 p.41 6360 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation
§2.5.3 p.59 6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
§2.5.5 p.61 6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances
§2.5.5 p.65 6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
§3.1 p.66 6364 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start
§3.2.3 p.73 6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem
§3.2.3 p.74 6366 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification
§3.2.4 p.74 6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world
§4.1 p.91 6370 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
§4.3.1 p.101 6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)
§4.3.1.5 p.105 6372 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
§5.4.3 p.137 6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary
§6.6 p.176 6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing