green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Michael Devitt, by Text

[American, b.1938, Professor at the University of Maryland, then Professor at the Graduate Centre of the City University of New York.]

1980 'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?
p.95 p.95 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have
p.97 p.97 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness'
p.98 p.98 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
2005 There is no a Priori
2 p.107 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical
2 p.107 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically
3 p.111 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything
2005 There is No A Priori (and reply)
1 p.185 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that
4 p.193 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality?
2008 Resurrecting Biological Essentialism
10 'Arb' p.243 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations
11 p.248 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
4 p.223 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [PG]
6 p.228 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
2009 Natural Kinds and Biological Realism
4 p.202 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all
6 p.211 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up
7 p.211 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is