| 1962 | Propositions |
| 01 | p.33 | 13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? |
| 01 | p.33 | 13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons |
| 03 | p.34 | 13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said |
| 05-06 | p.36 | 13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each |
| 07 | p.38 | 13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words |
| 10 | p.42 | 13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same |
| 11 | p.46 | 13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have |
| 12 | p.49 | 13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter |
| 12 | p.50 | 13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... |
| Add 2 | p.53 | 13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows |
| 1967 | Classes and Attributes |
| §2 | p.161 | 9783 | While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes |
| 1968 | Some Remarks on Essentialism |
| p.149 | p.149 | 13952 | Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent |
| p.157 | p.157 | 13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind |
| p.158 | p.158 | 13955 | Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic |
| p.158 | p.158 | 13954 | The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential |
| 1974 | Scattered Objects |
| p.175 | p.175 | 14961 | Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart |
| p.184 | p.184 | 14962 | Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts |
| 1987 | Intro to 'Philosophical Essays' |
| xi | p.-16 | 9784 | A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system |
| xxi | p.-6 | 9786 | Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard |