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Ideas of Stephen Yablo, by Text

[American, fl. 1996, Student of Donald Davidson. Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.]

1987 Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility
p.190 A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Rocca]
1993 Paradox without Self-Reference
p.168 An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Sorensen]
1998 Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?
IX p.129 For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value
XI p.132 Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures
XII p.135 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds'
2000 Apriority and Existence
02 p.198 Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties
06 p.203 The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae
12 p.213 Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential
12 p.214 Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors
13 p.216 We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets
13 p.218 We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer
14 p.219 If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise?
2001 Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism
05 p.182 Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world
13 p.197 Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts
2002 Abstract Objects: a Case Study
01 p.220 Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential
02 p.221 We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori
08 p.231 Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier
10 p.237 Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths
2002 Carving Content at the Joints
11 p.266 A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations
2014 Aboutness
Intro p.2 Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them
Intro p.2 If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter
Intro p.5 The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content
01.6 p.22 A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts
02.8 p.43 Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal
03.2 p.46 Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have
03.2 p.47 y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them
05.7 n20 p.87 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker
05.8 p.90 A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true
06.5 p.105 Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit
07.4 p.119 Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true
09.8 p.162 Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A
11.1 p.179 An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption
12.5 p.204 A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects